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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-4126 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALEXAMUEL GLENN, JR., 
a/k/a Prieto 
 
 
ALEXAMUEL GLENN, JR., 
                                            Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 1-10-cr-00005-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2013 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 3, 2013) 
 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 On January 30, 2012, Alexamuel Glenn Jr. pleaded guilty in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a two-count felony 
information charging him with one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess 
with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 
one count of conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o).  The plea agreement contained stipulations to two 
significant matters affecting the calculation of Glenn’s advisory guideline range 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  First, Glenn acknowledged that he 
was responsible for more than 500 grams but less than 2 kilograms of cocaine 
hydrochloride.  Second, Glenn conceded that three drug-related robberies or 
attempted robberies were attributable to him for sentencing purposes—a robbery 
on Ann Street in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and attempted robberies in Dauphin 
County and East Petersburg, Pennsylvania.  In addition, the government agreed 
that any information provided by Glenn would not be used against him in any 
subsequent prosecutions, but it reserved the right to use such information at 
sentencing.   
At the change of plea hearing, Glenn indicated that he had carefully 
reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney and voluntarily entered into it.  
When the factual basis for the guilty plea was placed on the record, Glenn offered 
only one clarification as to the Dauphin County attempted robbery—that until his 
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coconspirators pulled out their weapons, he thought he was driving his 
coconspirators to a drug deal and not a robbery.  Otherwise, Glenn admitted to all 
the other facts placed in the record by the prosecution, including that the Ann 
Street robbery involved the pistol whipping of a customer. 
 The United States Probation Office assembled a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) 
and submitted it to the parties on April 2, 2012.  Both parties objected to the report.  
Eventually, a revised PSR dated August 20, 2012, calculated Glenn’s base offense 
level at 29 with a criminal history level V, yielding an advisory guideline range of 
140 to 175 months’ imprisonment.  After hearing from witnesses, receiving 
exhibits, and hearing objections, the District Court adopted the PSR in its entirety 
and sentenced Glenn to 140 months’ imprisonment.   This timely appeal followed.1 
 Glenn argues that the District Court erred by improperly calculating his 
sentencing guideline range.  Glenn makes four arguments: (1) that the District 
Court improperly calculated his guideline range by grouping offenses for which he 
was neither convicted nor charged; (2) that the government failed to carry its 
burden of proof that he was involved in all the robberies used to calculate his 
guideline range; (3) that the District Court made a clear error in adopting the 
findings of the PSR in its entirety; and (4) that the District Court should not have 
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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allowed Glenn’s proffer statements to be used against him at sentencing.  These 
errors, according to Glenn, resulted in a procedurally unreasonable sentence.
2
 
 We have carefully reviewed the sentencing transcripts and the PSR.  We 
conclude that the District Court correctly applied the grouping rules and 
appropriately computed Glenn’s base offense level.  Although Glenn may not have 
been convicted of the robbery and attempted robberies at issue, the plea agreement 
and Glenn’s own testimony during the change of plea hearing confirmed that they  
were attributable to Glenn and, therefore, were appropriately considered in 
computing the base offense level.   
In light of Glenn’s stipulation in the plea agreement, his admissions during 
the change of plea hearing, and the evidence presented by the witnesses called to 
testify on behalf of the government, we conclude that the government adduced 
sufficient evidence to carry its burden of proof.  Indeed, the stipulations, Glenn’s 
admissions and the testimony of the witnesses demonstrate that the District Court 
did not err in adopting the PSR because the factual findings set forth therein were 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 
                                                 
2
  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the sentencing 
guidelines. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
District courts make factual determinations during sentencing by a preponderance 
of the evidence and we review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear 
error. Id. at 568, 570.   
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Glenn’s assertion that the District Court erred by allowing the government to 
use his own proffer against him at sentence lacks merit.  The robberies were the 
subject of a stipulation by the parties as set forth in the plea agreement, which 
specified that the government was “free to use at sentencing” any of Glenn’s 
statements and the evidence he provided. 
Because the District Court did not commit any procedural errors at 
sentencing, we conclude that Glenn’s sentence of 140 months is not procedurally 
unreasonable.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
 
 
